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From the Editor 
 
Pay For Performance 
 
In this issue of Value Based Purchasing, we spotlight the Pay for 
Performance (P4P) movement.  In broad terms, P4P is a system which 
rewards health care providers based on the quality and cost-
effectiveness of care they provide.  While “pay” generally means 
increased financial reimbursement, P4P programs also can reward 
performance through public recognition and/or steering increased 
business toward higher-performing providers.  Numerous questions 
have been raised about P4P, including: 
 
• If high-quality care is expected, is it necessary to pay bonuses 
based on actual performance? 
 
• Will the relatively modest levels of incentives offered by many P4P 
programs be enough to stimulate providers to change behaviors, 
revise office systems, and invest in IT and other technologies 
needed to improve performance? 
 
• Do we know enough about how to measure performance to have 
some degree of assurance that the quality indicators being 
measured are associated with better care and better outcomes? 
 
• Do P4P programs end up rewarding those providers who already 
are providing higher-quality care, and not have an impact on 
improving performance among a broader array of providers? 
 
Reports in the published literature on the impact of P4P programs are 
limited, and the evidence of their impact is mixed. 
 
Despite these questions, the P4P movement is gathering steam.  In 
December of 2006, Congress passed legislation, subsequently signed 
by President Bush, maintaining Medicare physician payment rates at 
their present levels for 2007, and canceling a scheduled 5% reduction.  
This benefit was linked, however, with a mandate for a 1.5% bonus 
system to be established for physicians participating in CMS’ quality-
reporting system.  The Physician Voluntary Reporting Program (PVRP) 
relies on physicians using a new set of billing codes.  Known as G-
codes, these codes capture information on whether quality indicators, 
which are not ordinarily captured through billing codes (CPT codes), 
were met.  
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Among the 16 current PVRP quality indicators, the 
majority are relevant to inpatient care.  Outpatient 
quality indicators include diabetes care, prevention 
of falls, pharmacotherapy for patients with heart 
disease, and treatment for major depression.   
Although the G-code system is complicated (some 
say it’s downright crazy), it speaks to government’s 
newfound commitment to physician P4P, following 
on CMS’ recent efforts to implement P4P for 
hospitals. 
It is doubtful that the federal government 
would have arrived at this level of commitment to 
paying for performance, were it not for the P4P 
demonstration and advocacy efforts of employers 
(e.g. Bridges to Excellence, Pacific Business Group 
on Health, Leapfrog Rewards).   Whether or not the 
P4P movement ultimately leads to improved quality 
and safety in health care, it stands as evidence that 
the work of employers who are engaged in value-
based purchasing can impact national health policy 
and stimulate innovation to address a troubled 
health care system. 
 
Neil Goldfarb, Editor 
Value-Based Purchasing 
 
 
VBP Interview 
with Dr. Arnold Milstein 
 
Janice L. Clarke, Managing Editor, VBP 
 
Arnold Milstein, MD, MPH, is the Medical Director 
of the Pacific Business Group on Health (PBGH), 
the largest employer health care purchasing 
coalition in the United States.  He is also the U.S. 
Health Care Thought Leader at Mercer Health & 
Benefits.  His work and publications focus on 
private and public sector health care purchasing 
strategy, clinical performance measurement, and 
the psychology of clinical performance 
improvement.   
 
A co-founder of both The Leapfrog Group and the 
Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project, Dr. 
Milstein heads performance measurement activities 
for both initiatives.  The New England Journal of 
Medicine’s series on employer sponsored health 
insurance described him as a “pioneer” in efforts to 
advance quality of care. In 2004 and 2005, he 
received the highest annual award of World-at-
Work, the largest global organization of human 
resource managers, and of the National Business 
Group on Health (NBGH). The NBGH award cited 
nationally recognized innovation and 
implementation success in health care cost 
reduction and quality gains. In 2006, he was the 
first private sector purchaser specialist to be 
elected to the Institute of Medicine. 
 
Dr. Milstein was educated at Harvard 
(BA-Economics), Tufts (MD) and UC-Berkeley 
MPH-Health Services Evaluation and Planning). 
************** 
 
VBP:  You have a unique perspective on 
eliminating waste in the U.S. heathcare system.  
 Would you give us the “nutshell” version? 
 
AM:    In the broad context, we are experiencing 
upward creep in the unaffordability of health 
insurance…an average policy for a family of four 
has grown from 15% to over 100% of annual 
minimum wage earnings.  This reflects health care 
spending that steadily outgrows our Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and income, mostly due 
to the net cost additive effect of reliable treatment 
innovations.  This annual cost-additive effect 
presents an increasing challenge because higher-
income Americans are not stepping forward to ease 
the burden for others.  Given this scenario, we 
need to do two jobs:  
1. Eliminate the current level of waste or “fat” 
2. Annually capture new efficiencies that are equal 
to the cost-additive effect of valuable treatment 
innovations. 
 
How much of our current spending is “waste”?  
Spending could be cut by 50% without any adverse 
impact on the health care system (evidence from 
the Dartmouth Atlas).  If all American physicians 
practiced with the same conservative resource use 
as the most conservative and high quality physician 
groups in the top performing regions (e.g., Seattle, 
Minneapolis), 30-40% of current spending could be 
eliminated without loss of quality or patient 
satisfaction.   Another 20-30% of spending could be 
eliminated if the remaining services were delivered 
at benchmark levels of cost per service. 
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VBP:   What do you see as the broad, systemic 
changes necessary for eliminating waste? 
 
AM: We can eliminate >50% of the waste in the 
system by taking the following sequential steps: 
1. Reduce service volume by 30% by 
emulating the resource use patterns of the 
best performing physician groups in the best 
performing regions. 
2. Once service volume is brought under 
control, work toward lowering unit prices for 
services to the level of those in the lowest 
cost, highest quality delivery systems. 
 
Note that, after eliminating all baseline waste, each 
year of biomedical “miracles” adds 2-4% to health 
care spending.  This means that reengineering 
must deliver a perpetual 2-4% annual efficiency 
capture in order to prevent, rather than simply 
postpone, affordability problems. 
 
VBP:  We keep hearing that electronic medical 
records (EMR) are part of the solution.  Where 
do they fit in your theory?   
 
AM: EMRs play an important role.  Just taking 
the paper out of health care by adopting free- 
standing EMRs will eliminate 3-4% of the waste in 
the system.  If EMRs become fully interoperable 
(i.e., each provider’s system able to share patient 
information with other providers’ systems) an 
additional 3-4% of “fat” can be shaved.   
 
But EMR’s are not a panacea.  Like any industry 
that aspires to world class levels of quality, 
reliability and efficiency, health care needs an 
electronic platform to test and rapidly implement 
performance-enhancing service innovations. 
 
The interesting question is, “Is there sufficient 
management and IT expertise in health care to 
enable robust and perpetual performance gains?” 
World class, or even elementary, process 
engineering skills are not taught substantively in 
most medical or nursing schools.   
 
In manufacturing and advanced service companies, 
an electronic platform is used to design process 
improvements, implement the improvements, 
monitor the effects of the improvements, and 
rapidly standardize to the new process when it has 
been improved.  Health care needs to begin to work 
this way.  Without a well designed electronic 
platform, rapid cycle testing and adoption of many 
simultaneous service innovations is not possible. 
 
Currently, only a handful of health care systems 
(about 2% of the nation’s systems) “get it.”  A few 
examples are Inter-Mountain Healthcare System, 
Virginia Mason, Mayo, Kaiser Permanente, 
Vanderbilt, Duke, and Partners’ in Boston. 
 
VBP: What role does the consumer play? 
 
AM: Consumers can have a powerful effect on 
 any industry.  Weak assertion of customer values 
 makes for poor performing industries.  American 
 customers need to be educated on how to say “no” 
 to high prices without corresponding evidence of 
 superior quality and lower total longitudinal cost of 
 care. 
 
VBP: How can employers/purchasers of health 
care influence the health care industry to make 
 the necessary changes?   
 
AM: Focus on creating a “performance-sensitive”  
market where the most leverage is – with individual  
physicians.  Physicians are the only ones who are 
legally empowered to write orders for all categories 
of health care resources, and they heavily influence 
patient behavior. Even more important, no one has 
greater ability to insist upon integration of IT- 
enabled process engineering in hospitals and all 
other facets of care delivery. Employers should  
support only those insurers and/or business  
coalitions that will deliver, report and incentivize 
improvement in two measures for each physician. 
1. An aggregate quality metric, i.e., a single 
specialty-relevant statistic for each 
physician.  
2. An average total spending metric (i.e., 
average, case severity mix-adjusted, total 
cost per episode-of-care and year-of-
chronic-care) for patients primarily managed 
by each physician.  
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Such a performance-sensitive market could 
catalyze health industry transformation. 
 
VBP: Is there evidence that these strategies will 
be successful? 
 
AM: The large Las Vegas gaming companies 
and their union improved quality and reduced 
 health care spending by 10% relative to the  
insurance trend over a 2-year period through such  
an approach; and even greater progress is likely to  
occur in their next phase. 
 
Another example is Massachusetts State 
employees.  Unlike Las Vegas, the state 
employees are distributed over six different health 
plans.  The state persuaded health plans to merge 
their claims data to enable more reliable physician 
performance assessments, and each plan was 
permitted to use its judgment with regard to 
strategy(ies), i.e., tiering the network, limiting the 
network, and/or P4P.  In partnership with the 
Massachusetts Medical Society and state 
performance improvement leaders such as MHQP, 
continuous refinements are underway.  
 
 
VBP: Your work has been described as 
“motivating physicians to lead health industry 
performance breakthrough.”  How do you represent 
your model for such changes graphically?   
 
AM:  
 
 
 
To learn more about Dr. Milstein’s work, you may 
contact him at the following: 
 
Arnold Milstein, MD, MPH 
Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 1500 
San Francisco, California 94111 
(415) 743-8803 
www.arnold.milstein@mercer.com 
 
 
Value of Business Coalitions in 
Implementing 
Bridges to Excellence Programs 
 
Adapted from an article by Andrew Webber, president 
and chief executive officer of the National Business 
Coalition on Health in Washington, D.C.   NBCH (at 
www.nbch.org) has a membership of nearly 90 
employer-led coalitions in the United States, 
representing more than 7,000 employers and 34 million 
employees and their dependents. 
 
In April of 2006, eight employers in Colorado 
Springs (CO), representing 50,000 lives, 
announced that they are participating in a Bridges 
to Excellence (BTE) program 
(www.bridgestoexcellence.org), a pay for 
performance program that rewards physicians who 
provide top quality care to patients.  This program 
is focused on helping to control the cost of diabetes 
for employees and their dependents while 
increasing the overall quality of health care for the 
participants.    
 
The eight employers are members of the Colorado 
Business Group on Health (CBGH), a non-profit 
coalition based in Denver 
(www.coloradohealthonline.org).  They include the 
City of Colorado Springs, Colorado College, 
Colorado Springs School District #11, Colorado 
Springs Utilities, El Paso County, Intel, Memorial 
Health System, and Penrose-St. Francis Health 
Services.  David Lord, director of special projects 
for Colorado College and chair of the CBGH 
diabetes program, credits CBGH with the 
successful launch of the program.  “A large group 
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such as CBGH gives employers more leverage in 
negotiating with healthcare providers, insurance 
companies, and health plans.”  
 
In 2004, CBGH (a member of the National 
Business Coalition on Health) worked with its 
employer members to develop a program that 
focused on diabetes among employees and their 
dependents.  The program goals included 
increasing the rate of early detection of diabetes, 
improving the amount and quality of diabetes 
education offered, and improving benefit designs 
for those with diabetes.      
 
The diabetes BTE program recently implemented in 
Colorado Springs will reward physicians who meet 
the standards for diabetes care from the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance. These standards 
encourage physicians to work in collaboration with 
their patients to avoid the serious complications 
that can result when diabetes is not managed 
appropriately.  Physicians who treat employees 
and/or their dependents with diabetes will be 
eligible for as much as $100 per patient per year if 
standards are met.  
 
The diabetes BTE program will also include 
incentives for employees and their family members 
with diabetes.  For instance, beneficiaries may earn 
up to $200 in cash for participating in wellness 
activities such as joining a gym or completing a 
health risk assessment.   
 
Donna Marshall, executive director of CBGH, says 
the BTE program demonstrates what employers 
can accomplish by working together. “The eight 
employers in this diabetes BTE program are 
expecting to see improvements in costs and quality 
in the years to come. They also recognize that we 
have to embrace a wide range of initiatives to get 
the outcomes we need in terms of lower costs and 
better health care.” 
 
Colorado College is one example of an employer 
that uses a combination of strategies to contain 
healthcare costs.  Three years ago, the college 
started a self-funded insurance program for its 600 
employees and 1,500 covered lives.  In subsequent 
years the college added wellness and illness 
prevention initiatives. As a result of this multi-
faceted approach, the college anticipates a 4% rise 
in its healthcare costs for the coming academic 
year – a significant decrease from the 15% to 18% 
annual increases the college experienced 
previously.   
 
CBHG affords its members the opportunity to 
discuss the problem of increasing healthcare costs 
with other employers and to share successful 
solutions.  Lord says, “As a member of CBGH, we 
can share best practices, review educational 
materials used by other employers and buy 
services for health screenings in bulk.  It would be 
much more difficult to accomplish these things as 
an individual employer.” 
 
BTE programs combined with wellness initiatives 
can help to change the healthcare system from one 
that reacts to illness to one that rewards healthy 
behaviors.  CBHG believes that this is the best way 
to control healthcare costs in the long-term.   
 
 
P4P “Primer” 
 
Valerie Pracilio, BS and Janice Clarke, RN, BBA 
 
Pay for performance (P4P) is a strategy that 
rewards healthcare providers for improving the 
quality and cost-effectiveness of care they deliver 
to patients.  P4P is viewed by many as a solution to 
soaring healthcare costs, rising malpractice fees 
and growing quality concerns.  An increasingly 
popular concept among businesses and health 
plans, the Federal government is also beginning to 
implement P4P initiatives via the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).       
 
P4P is defined by the Leapfrog Group as “incentive 
programs designated to overcome the limitations of 
current reimbursement arrangements by aligning 
financial rewards with improved outcomes.”1 P4P 
programs set expectations, measure performance, 
and present rewards based on the results.2 The 
three primary objectives of P4P are:  
 Creating a fair payment system,  
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 Creating financial incentives for improved 
outcomes, and  
 Encouraging providers to add efficiency by 
stretching financial resources.3   
 
The key players in P4P are providers, payers and 
the federal government.  Commercial health plan 
and government P4P programs exert pressure on 
providers (i.e., physicians and specialists) to 
perform well with respect to quality benchmarks 
and to share their quality scores or rankings 
publicly in order to receive financial incentive 
payments.   
 
According to Kaveh Safavi of Solucient (an 
information products company that serves the 
healthcare industry and maintains the nation’s 
largest healthcare database), providers are most 
concerned about the fairness of P4P payment 
methods.  Some payers (ie, healthcare insurance 
companies) provide the P4P incentive payments to 
physicians based on the magnitude of improvement 
in performance on certain measures.  Physicians 
argue that providers who demonstrate high quality 
pre- and post-implementation of P4P receive less 
of an incentive than those whose performance went 
from poor to good.   
 
In an article for Physician Executive, Lawrence Fink 
describes P4P as a program that “disvalues 
medical ethics.” He writes that P4P is driving 
providers out of the system and leading to the 
establishment of concierge service medicine.4 
While Fink believes that the ethical components of 
beneficence and non-maleficence are lacking in 
P4P programs, others believe that there is nothing 
unethical about offering incentives to physicians to 
encourage good quality.   
 
Although the U.S. healthcare system is more 
advanced than other nations’, its considerable 
resources are being used inefficiently.  Among the 
current initiatives to improve efficiency in health 
care are: 
 Rules of engagement for efficiency, established 
by a collaborative effort among the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 
Bridges to Excellence and The Leapfrog 
Group.5   
 Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set 
(HEDIS) measures for payers scheduled to be 
introduced in 2008 by the National Committee 
for Quality Assurance (NCQA.)  
 Cost-efficiency improvements envisioned by the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC), a Federal government initiative.    
 
In its recommendation to the Congress, MedPAC 
asked that a portion of Medicare payments be 
made to hospitals, physicians, home health 
agencies, providers of dialysis patients, and 
Medicare Advantage (MA) patients based on 
quality.6  Another government agency, the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, 
provides data sharing and a reporting mechanism 
for hospital quality indicators.   
 
Medicare should, at minimum, get the best value 
possible for the dollars spent.6 The rate set aside 
by Medicare for P4P initiatives is 1-2% of current 
payments per provider.  Pay-for-performance will 
alleviate one of Medicare’s historic problems – the 
system makes equal payment to providers 
regardless of the quality of care they deliver.1 
Under a P4P program, provider payments will be 
based on their ratings on a set of quality indicators.   
 
Summary:  P4P is a strategy aimed at aligning 
healthcare provider payments with the efficiency 
and quality of care delivered.  Specific quality 
standards are set by the CMS, JCAHO, and 
NCQA/HEDIS.   Ongoing evaluation of P4P 
programs will determine their effectiveness in 
changing patterns of healthcare delivery and 
improving quality.   
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Program Schedule 
 
 
This e-journal, Value Based Purchasing, is a 
product of The College for Advanced Management 
of Health Benefits, a unique training program 
designed to help employee benefit managers meet 
the growing challenges of providing high quality 
health benefits and managing rising benefit costs.  
The College offers a practical, intensive program 
that focuses on benefits purchasing techniques and 
skills that emphasize improving the value, quality-
cost ratio, and effectiveness of health care services 
purchased on behalf of employees.  The program is 
a collaboration between the HealthCare21 
Business Coalition in Tennessee, the National 
Business Coalition on Health, and the Department 
of Health Policy of Thomas Jefferson University.   
 
Three College sessions are currently planned for 
2007: 
 March 19-21 in Las Vegas, NV 
 June 4-6 in Nashville, TN 
 September 24-26 in Columbus, OH 
 
For more information, or registration materials, 
please contact Jeannine Kinney, Program 
Coordinator, at jeannine.kinney@jefferson.edu, or 
215-955-1709. 
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